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SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY, FAIRNESS, AND
PERSONAL JURISDICTION: THE CASE
FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
TRANSIENT JURISDICTION
EARL M. MALTZ*
The concept of transient jurisdiction-the theory that states may al-
ways exercise personal jurisdiction over a person served within its territo-
rial boundaries-has proven to be a tenacious adversary for legal
academics. For years, commentators repeatedly have attacked transient
jurisdiction, viewing it as an outmoded relic of a now-discredited theory
of personal jurisdiction. Some courts have accepted this argument and
abandoned the concept; others, however, have continued to view tran-
sient jurisdiction as an acceptable basis for the assertion of personal juris-
diction over defendants.
This Article challenges the conventional scholarly wisdom and con-
tends that transient jurisdiction fits comfortably within the Supreme
Court's basic structure of personal jurisdiction analysis. Part I traces the
development of transient jurisdiction and the arguments against it. Part
II discusses the Court's current approach to personal jurisdiction
problems generally, concluding that the case law reflects the principle
that a defendant is generally subject to the jurisdiction of any sovereign
with which the defendant has voluntarily associated itself. Part III dem-
onstrates that the exercise of transient jurisdiction is perfectly consistent
* Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden). The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Professor Allen Stein, who read an earlier draft of this Article and made helpful comments.
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with this principle, and that to deny states jurisdiction over transients
would create an imbalance in the transients' rights and obligations.
I. THE HISTORY OF TRANSIENT JURISDICTION
Historically, the concept of transient jurisdiction has been associated
with the jurisdictional approach of Pennoyer v. Neff.' The theory of the
Pennoyer Court was that the right of a court to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion was a function of the physical power of the forum state. Thus, in an
in personam action, state courts had jurisdiction if the parties to the law-
suit were served within the state. Similarly, in in rem and quasi in rem
actions, state courts possessed jurisdiction if the state was the situs of the
property at issue.
Grace v. MacArthur2 presented an extreme example of the exercise of
transient jurisdiction. In Grace, an Illinois resident was served with a
summons to appear in an Arkansas federal court while flying in a com-
mercial airliner that was passing over Arkansas. The district court re-
fused to quash service, holding that the defendant had been within the
territorial limits of the state when the summons was delivered. Although
the issue of the case was one of service, the court implied that the service
also satisfied the requirement that the state have jurisdictional power
over the defendant.
During this period, courts generally recognized only one exception to
transient jurisdiction. Where the plaintiff had lured the defendant into
the forum state under false pretenses, courts at times held that the forum
lacked jurisdiction over the defendant. Wyman v. Newhouse I is a classic
example.
In Wyman, the defendant was a New York resident who had never
lived in Florida. For some years he had been engaged in an extramarital
love affair with the plaintiff, a Florida resident. The plaintiff sent a series
of communications to the defendant, expressing love and affection for the
defendant. She stated that she was soon departing for Ireland to care for
her mother and that she "[m]ust see" the defendant. In response to these
entreaties, the defendant flew to Florida, whereupon he was served with
process in a lawsuit for $500,000. The defendant quickly left the state
and the plaintiff obtained a default judgment. In an enforcement action,
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
3. 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declined to
enforce the judgment, holding that "[a] fraud affecting the jurisdiction is
equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction."4
This exception was not a serious threat to the basic concept of tran-
sient jurisdiction. Indeed, despite claims that the theory of transient ju-
risdiction was inherently unsound,5 so long as Pennoyer reigned supreme
the foundations of the concept were unassailable. But, as any first year
law student knows, in 1945 the Supreme Court displaced Pennoyer with
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.6 International Shoe replaced the
power theory with one based on fairness to the defendant. The key ques-
tion became whether the defendant had "minimum contacts" with the
forum state such that the maintenance of the lawsuit "does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."7
Post-Shoe commentators vigorously attacked the theory of transient
jurisdiction. Why, they asked, is it "fair" to subject a defendant to a
lawsuit in a state that he may have only entered once in his lifetime? The
critics contended that the concept was simply a vestige of the discredited
power theory.8
The critics intensified their attack after the 1977 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Shaffer v. Heitner.9 In Shaffer a shareholder of the Greyhound
Corporation initiated a derivative action in Delaware state court. The
complaint stated that several present and former officers of Greyhound
and one of its subsidiaries had violated their respective duties to the cor-
poration, causing liability to Greyhound for penalties and damages under
the antitrust laws. Greyhound was a Delaware corporation, but the de-
fendants did not reside in the state. Nonetheless, the Delaware Supreme
Court found that the state courts had personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendants because the courts had seized the defendants' Greyhound stock,
and under state law the stock was "located" in Delaware, even though it
4. Id. at 315 (citations omitted).
5. See, eg., W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 100
(1942); Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 U. ILL. L. REv. 427 (1929).
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
7. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463).
8. See, eg., R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 27 (3d ed. 1977); Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J.
289 (1956); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 241 (1965);
Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958); Von Mehren &
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
9. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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was not physically in the state.1" Applying the rule of Pennoyer, the
court held that state courts could, on a quasi in rem theory, base jurisdic-
tion on that seizure.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed."1 Overruling Pennoyer, Jus-
tice Marshall's majority opinion argued that the "minimum contacts"
standard established in International Shoe Co. should determine the va-
lidity of all assertions of personal jurisdiction-even jurisdiction based on
an in rem or quasi in rem theory. 2 Applying that standard in Shaffer,
the majority found that the due process clause prohibited the assertion of
state jurisdiction.
The commentary on the Shaffer case concluded almost unanimously
that the Court's opinion mandated the death of transient jurisdiction.13
Obviously, this conclusion could not be based on the specific facts in
Shaffer. The Shaffer Court based its argument on the theory that the
seized property was unrelated'to the litigation, 14 while the transient de-
fendant herself will always be related to the dispute that gives rise to
service upon her. Indeed, Justice Stevens's concurrence implicitly en-
dorsed transient jurisdiction.I
The commentators, however, focused on the majority's sweeping asser-
10. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1975), rev'd, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
11. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
12. Id. at 212.
13. See, eg., R. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 2.04(2)(c) (1983); Bernstine, Shaf-
fer v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 VILL. L.
REv. 38 (1979); Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Last Words on State Court
Jurisdiction, 26 EMORY L.J. 739 (1977); Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Summons After
Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 ORE. L. REv. 505 (1978); Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdic-
tion After World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729 (1981); Redish,
Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV.
1112 (1981); Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences ofShaffer v. Heit-
ner, 63 IowA L. REV. 1031 (1978); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 33 (1978); Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 670 (1987);
Vernon, Single Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v.
Heitner, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 273; Zammit, Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 15 (1978). But see Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in
the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 24-25 (1982) (transient jurisdiction survives Shaffer); Glen, An
Analysis of "Mere Presence" and Other Traditional Bases of Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 607,
611-612 (1979) (same). Cf Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court
Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77, 82 (Shaffer unclear on transient jurisdiction).
14. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213 (Delaware court could not base jurisdiction on property located in
Delaware but not related to the suit. Jurisdiction would have to be based on something more.).
15. 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("If I visit another State... I knowingly assume
some risk that the State will exercise its power over.., my person while there").
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tions regarding the reach of the minimum contacts analysis. Professor
David H. Vernon captured the essence of the argument:
Shaffer requires that "all" state-court assertions of jurisdiction meet the
standards of International Shoe. The Court held presence of property in the
forum permitted assertions of jurisdiction only if the forum also had a
nexus with both the litigation and the defendant. Unless Shaffer is limited
to jurisdiction based on the presence of property, the validity of the tran-
sient defendant rule after Shaffer is doubtful. The single factor of the de-
fendant's transient presence in the forum contributes nothing more than the
presence of the defendant's property in the forum to the existence of a fo-
rum interest in the outcome, the convenience of the forum as a place to
litigate, or a reason for defendant to anticipate suit there. Because it was
unfair to assert jurisdiction in Shaffer, it is unfair to assert jurisdiction in
the transient defendant case.16
Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of the U.S.A. 7 is the leading case
adopting the position of those who oppose transient jurisdiction. In Ne-
hemiah a champion hurdler lost his eligibility to compete in amateur
track and field competition when he signed a contract to play profes-
sional football. He brought an action in Federal District Court for the
District of New Jersey against the International Amateur Athletic Foun-
dation (IAAF)-the body responsible for setting standards internation-
ally for amateur track and field competition-seeking to force arbitration
of his disqualification.'"
IAAF, an unincorporated association, has its headquarters and only
offices in London, England. IAAF created its only connection with New
Jersey when the organization lent its name to the world cross-country
championships that took place in that state. When the president of
IAAF and another representative of that body attended the cross-coun-
try championships, the defendant's attorneys personally served them
with the complaint. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted Pro-
fessor Vernon's position and found that this service was not sufficient to
allow the New Jersey courts to assert jurisdiction over IAAF.2 0 Noting
that Shaffer expressly made the International Shoe standards applicable
to all attempts to exercise personal jurisdiction, the court declined to cre-
16. Vernon, supra note 13, at 303 (citations omitted).
17. 765 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985).
18. Id. at 43-44.
19. Id. at 44-45.
20. Id. at 47.
1988]
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ate a "sui generis niche for jurisdiction over the individual who purpose-
fully enters the jurisdiction and is served."21 The court argued that "[i]f
the mere presence of property cannot support quasi in rem jurisdiction, it
is difficult to find a basis in logic and fairness to conclude that the more
fleeting physical presence of a nonresident person can support personal
jurisdiction."22
Other courts have taken similar positions. Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp. 23 and Bershaw v. Sarbacher24 present typical examples. In Schrei-
ber, the plaintiff, a Kansas resident, was injured in Kansas while working
on a Roto-Baler manufactured by the Allis-Chalmers Corporation. Seek-
ing to secure the benefit of the Mississippi statute of limitations, the
plaintiff brought suit in federal district court in Mississippi, a state in
which Allis-Chalmers maintained an unrelated manufacturing facility
and was duly licensed, qualified and authorized to do business.25 The
court obtained jurisdiction over the defendant by service on the defend-
ant's designated agent for receiving service and by personal service on the
general manager of the manufacturing facility. After a motion by Allis-
Chalmers, the Mississippi court transferred the lawsuit to the Kansas
federal district court.2 6
Despite the transfer, the plaintiff argued that the Mississippi statute of
limitations still applied by virtue of Mississippi conflicts law and the rules
of Klaxon v. Stentor Manufacturing Corp. 27 and Van Dusen v. Barrack 28
Assuming that Mississippi conflicts law required this conclusion, this re-
21. Id.
22. Id. at 47.
23. 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979).
24. 40 Wash. App. 653, 700 P.2d 347 (1985). See also, eg., Pitman v. Typecraft Software Ltd.,
626 F. Supp. 305, 310-312 (N.D. IlL. 1986); Grendene, S.A. v. Brazam Int'l. Trading Corp., No. 83
Civ. 9782 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1986) (WEsTLAW, All. Fed. database) ("serious doubts"); Oden Opti-
cal Co., Inc. v. Optique Du Mond, Ltd., 268 Ark. 1105, 598 S.W.2d 456 (Ark. App. 1980) ("may
need reevaluation"); Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 1986); Brent v. Board of Trust-
ees of Davis and Elkins College, 163 W. Va. 390, 256 S.E.2d 432 (1979) (by implication).
25. 448 F. Supp. at 1081.
26. Id. at 1081-82. The court transferred the lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section
1404(a) states: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought."
27. 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must follow conflict of
laws rules of the states in which they sit).
28. 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (when a defendant procures a transfer to another district court the
transferee court must apply the state law that would have applied had there been no change of
venue).
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sult could only be avoided if (a) the Mississippi state courts lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant or (b) the application of the
Mississippi statute of limitations would be unconstitutional. The district
court chose the former ground, concluding, inter alia, that after Shaffer
the simple presence of Allis-Chalmers in Mississippi was constitutionally
insufficient to grant the courts of that state jurisdiction over an unrelated
cause of action.29
Bershaw was a Washington paternity action in which the plaintiff, a
Washington resident, claimed that the child was conceived during sexual
intercourse that had taken place in Idaho. The defendant, an Idaho resi-
dent, was served with process while visiting the state of Washington at
the plaintiff's invitation. Citing International Shoe and Shaffer, a Wash-
ington state court concluded with little discussion that "[the defendant's]
transient presence in Washington was insufficient to require him to con-
duct his defense in Washington. 3 0
Cases such as Nehemiah, Schreiber and Bershaw have not, however,
been universally followed. A number of courts that have addressed the
issue have rejected the conclusion that Shaffer sounded the death knell
for transient jurisdiction. For example, in Humphrey v. Langford3 1 a
state court was forced to confront the question directly and emphatically
reaffirmed the viability of transient jurisdiction.
Humphrey was a breach of contract action involving the sale of a
South Carolina business. When the agreement was executed, all parties
were residents of South Carolina. Later, however, the prospective plain-
tiffs moved to Georgia. The defendant, still a resident of South Carolina,
was served with process when he came to Georgia one day to bowl. 32
The Georgia Supreme Court held that this service was sufficient to vest
the state courts with personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The court
explicitly noted the variety of scholars who had contended that Shaffer
represented the end of transient jurisdiction. It rejected these conten-
tions, however, relying primarily on the practical difficulties involved in
distinguishing between different classes of nonresidents for jurisdictional
purposes:
We believe that it is not practical to have classifications of sojourners in the
state. Where does a court draw the line between sojourners here for an
29. 448 F. Supp. at 1090.
30. 40 Wash. App. at 657, 700 P.2d at 349 (citation omitted).
31. 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
32. Id.
19881
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evening of bowling and sojourners who commute to the state on a daily
basis? Some individuals are constant or perennial sojourners. Some have
no identifiable place of residence. Still others are able to avoid personal
service by remaining away from an otherwise indentifiable place of abode.
Others to avoid a responsibility can terminate on a moments notice a legal
residence and otherwise disrupt the judicial process. Others can terminate
residence in a forum favorable to the plaintiff and establish residence in a
forum considered favorable to the defendant.33
The specific argument employed by the Georgia court is rather weak;
distinguishing between different types of sojourners is no more difficult
than applying the minimum contacts methodology generally. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dealt more plausibly
with the issues in Amusement Equipment, Inc. v. Mordelt.34 Mordelt in-
volved an action by a Florida corporation (Amusement) against a Ger-
man corporation (Heimo) and the general manager of that corporation
(Mordelt). While visiting Heimo's factory in Germany, a representative
of Amusement discussed the possibility of acquiring certain of Heimo's
products for exhibition at a trade show in New Orleans on November 17.
Amusement ordered the goods from Florida.35 When they failed to ar-
rive on time, Amusement sued in Federal District Court for the District
of Louisiana to recover its payment.
The plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction based upon personal service deliv-
ered to Mordelt while he was attending the New Orleans trade show.
Heimo's only connection with Louisiana was as a member of the organi-
zation that sponsored the trade show. Mordelt had no prior connection
with Louisiana. The court of appeals reversed a contrary district court
holding36 and held that Louisiana law barred the assertion of jurisdiction
over Heimo.37 The court, however, also held that the trial court had
jurisdiction over Mordelt.
While it noted various factors that would support such jurisdiction
independently of Mordelt's presence in Louisiana, Judge Goldberg's
opinion of the court clearly reflected approval of the concept of transient
33. 246 Ga. at 734, 273 S.E.2d at 24.
34. 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985).
35. Id. at 265-66. In order to meet the November 17 deadline, the products needed to have
arrived in Miami by November 12. Heimo required prepayment prior to shipment of the goods
overseas. In response to a telex sent by Amusement from Florida, Heimo responded that it could
"guarantee [compliance with Amusement's] delivery requirements" if Heimo's bank received the
payment by November 7. Heimo received the payment on time.
36. 595 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1984).
37. Id. at 267.
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jurisdiction. Goldberg began his analysis by quoting a passage from In-
ternational Shoe itself that explicitly excluded transient jurisdiction from
the minimum contacts analysis:
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 38
To support his conclusion that "[w]hen the defendant is present within
the forum state, notice of the suit through proper service of process is all
the process to which he is due,"39 Goldberg characterized the problem as
one of sovereign authority:
By entering Louisiana, [the defendant] subjected himself to sovereign pow-
ers from which, had he remained outside the state, he was otherwise
protected.
... While the due process clause necessarily restricts the state's sovereign
power, no case has yet held that it eliminates that power altogether. That
the requirement of personal jurisdiction rests in all cases on the due process
clause does not weaken the proposition that the exercise of jurisdiction, as
distinguished from its limitation, is a sovereign act. If there is anything that
characterizes sovereignty, it is the state's dominion over its territory and
those within it. Fairness does not operate in a vacuum. To abstract it from
context and elevate it blindly over sovereign prerogatives is ultimately to
free the individual from the obligations inherent in a statist system.40
Viewing the case from this perspective, the court had no difficulty in
holding that the exercise of transient jurisdiction in Mordelt was
constitutional.
One could distinguish Mordelt from the typical transient jurisdiction
case on a variety of grounds. Indeed, the contacts between Mordelt and
the forum might well have been sufficient to support the assertion of ju-
risdiction under more general principles of specific jurisdiction.4 The
reasoning of the case, however, is consistent with the views expressed by
a number of other courts-most often in dicta.42 The Wisconsin
38. 779 F.2d at 269 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))
(emphasis in Mordelt).
39. 779 F.2d at 270.
40. Id. (citation omitted).
41. See infra notes 48-87 and accompanying text.
42. Leab v. Streit, 548 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also, e.g., Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832
F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1987) (dictum); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 & n.25 (Ist Cir. 1978)
(dictum), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d 581
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Supreme Court captured the essence of these courts' position in Oxmans'
Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer.43 Noting first that "[p]hysical presence is
the traditional basis of judicial jurisdiction," the Blacketer court then
continued:
In our view the United States Supreme Court has not imposed a "mini-
mum contacts" requirement on a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a nat-
ural person upon whom personal service within the state has been achieved.
Neither International Shoe nor its progeny, including the recent case of
Shaffer v. Heitner addresses the issue of the constitutionality of the state's
exercising jurisdiction based solely on the service of process upon an indi-
vidual physically present within state borders.44
Similarly, in Leab v. Streit,5 the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York stated that "[p]resence within a state, even tempo-
rary or transitory presence, is still a common law basis instilling compe-
tence in the courts of that state to adjudicate claims against a person. '46
In short, the issue of transient jurisdiction presents a situation in which
commentators have almost unanimously advocated one position, while
many courts have continued to support the opposing view. The key
question is whether these courts are acting totally irrationally or whether
they have simply failed to articulate a plausible rationale for transient
jurisdiction that has also escaped the notice of the academy. To ade-
quately address this question, one must first analyze in greater detail the
basic structure of personal jurisdiction analysis. The next section of this
Article will attempt such an analysis.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The Court has divided personal jurisdiction problems into two basic
categories. Specific jurisdiction rests on the power of the forum court to
adjudicate the defendant's rights in the specific case before the court. By
contrast, general jurisdiction allows the court to bind the defendant in all
cases in which the court also has subject matter jurisdiction. In the ab-
(1987); Wolfson v. Wolfson, 455 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Ruggieri v. General Well
Service, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982) (dictum); Opert v. Schmid, 535 F. Supp. 591
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Alumina] Indus. v. Newtown Commercial Assoc., 89 F.R.D. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Stevens v. Stevens, 44 Colo. App. 252, 611 P.2d 590 (1980) (dictum).
43. 86 Wis.2d 683, 273 N.W.2d 285 (1979).
44. Id. at 687-88, 273 N.W.2d at 287 (footnotes and citations omitted).
45. 584 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
46. Id. at 755-56.
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stract, at least, the presence of the defendant might be relevant to either
situation.
A. Specific Jurisdiction
1. Preliminary Comment: Specific Jurisdiction and the Transient
Defendant
All of the specific jurisdiction cases faced by the Court have involved
defendants who were served outside the forum state. In theory, one
could construct a rule that related the transient presence of the defendant
to the basic concept of specific jurisdiction. For example, the rule could
provide that a state court can exercise jurisdiction in all cases in which
the defendant has been served within the forum state and the transaction
giving rise to the lawsuit is related to that state.
Such a rule, however, would be inconsistent with the basic structure of
specific jurisdiction. Commentators have suggested various approaches
to the specific jurisdiction issue.47 Despite the differences among these
approaches, all share a distinguishing characteristic: each of the pro-
posed systems centers on the relationship between the defendant and the
relevant transaction, and between the transaction and the forum. The
mere presence of the defendant in the forum, without more, is irrelevant
to either of these considerations. To add this factor to the specific juris-
diction calculus would therefore be wildly incongruous. Thus, if tran-
sient jurisdiction is to be defended, it must be in the context of its
origin-the theory of general jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the resolution of specific jurisdiction problems has an im-
portant bearing on the transient jurisdiction issue. As this Article dis-
cusses below, the structure of general jurisdiction analysis is best
understood by considering it in tandem with specific jurisdiction. Thus,
in order to lay the groundwork for a discussion of transient jurisdiction,
the next section describes in detail the Court's treatment of specific juris-
diction cases, together with the views of commentators who have dis-
cussed this problem.
2. The Approach of the Supreme Court
Specific jurisdiction has attracted the bulk of the attention of both the
Supreme Court and the academic commentators. Four cases-Burger
47. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
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King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,48 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc.,4 9 World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,5" and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Ct. of California51-define the parameters of the Court's approach to the
specific jurisdiction problem.52
In Burger King, the defendant had never physically been present in the
state of Florida. He had, however, entered into a franchise agreement
with a Florida corporation which contemplated a continuing relationship
with the defendant and required payments to be made in Miami, Florida.
Under these circumstances, the Court held that in a lawsuit over an al-
leged breach of the franchise agreement, the Florida courts could consti-
tutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The
majority opinion asserted that
where the contacts [with the forum] proximately result from actions by the
defendant himself that create a "substantial connection" with the forum
State... he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting
business there, and because his activities are shielded by "the benefits and
protections" of the forum's laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to
require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well.53
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Co. involved facts which were, in some
respects, even more dramatic. In Keeton, the plaintiff brought a libel
action in the federal district court for the state of New Hampshire. The
defendant was an Ohio corporation whose principal place of business was
California. Its only connection with New Hampshire was that a small
proportion of the total number of magazines which it produced (some of
which contained the allegedly libelous statements) were sold in that state.
The plaintiff was a New York resident. Her only connection with the
forum was that her name appeared on the masthead of several magazines
which were distributed in New Hampshire. Plaintiff suffered only a
small portion of her claimed damages in the forum state. Nonetheless,
the Court unanimously held that the fourteenth amendment did not pre-
vent the New Hampshire courts from asserting jurisdiction over the de-
48. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
49. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
50. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
51. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
52. Other specific jurisdiction cases decided in the post-Warren era include: Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980);
Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
53. 471 U.S. at 475-76 (emphasis in original) (citations and footnote omitted).
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fendant.54 The Court stated that "[w]here, as in this case, [the
defendant] has continuously and deliberately exploited the New Hamp-
shire market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there
in a libel action based on the contents of its magazine.""
Burger King and Keeton demonstrate clearly that when the defendant
himself has deliberately created a connection with the forum in a particu-
lar transaction, the forum courts will generally have jurisdiction to adju-
dicate his rights and liabilities in connection with that transaction. By
contrast, World- Wide Volkswagen held that creation of such a connec-
tion by the plaintiff was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the forum.56
In World- Wide Volkswagen the plaintiffs, then New York residents,
had purchased an automobile from the defendants in Massena, New
York. The following year the plaintiffs decided to move to Arizona. En
route to their new home, they had an automobile accident in Oklahoma
in which one of the plaintiffs suffered severe injuries. The plaintiffs sued
on a products liability theory in an Oklahoma state court.
The plaintiffs based their jurisdictional argument on the theory of ac-
tual foreseeability. They reasoned that because of the nature of the prod-
uct, the defendants should have foreseen the possibility that it would be
used in another state and cause injury there. Thus, notwithstanding the
fact that the relevant defendants had no other contacts with the forum
state, plaintiffs contended that the assumption of jurisdiction by an
Oklahoma court was consistent with constitutional norms.5 7
Speaking for a six-member majority, Justice White disagreed. He con-
ceded that "foreseeability is [not] wholly irrelevant."58 White, however,
was addressing legal rather than actual foreseeability.
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state. Rather, it is
that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.59
This type of foreseeability in turn was to be determined by reference to
the judicial interpretations of the International Shoe standards. Finding
a "total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary
54. 465 U.S. at 772.
55. Id. at 781 (citation omitted).
56. 444 U.S. at 291-92.
57. Id. at 288-91.
58. Id. at 297.
59. Id. (citations omitted).
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predicate to any exercise of state court jurisdiction,"'  White concluded
that these standards had not been met in World-Wide Volkswagen.
Asahi Metal Industry presented an intermediate level of involvement
with the forum state. The case began as a products liability action aris-
ing from a motorcycle accident which occurred in California. The cause
of the accident was a rear tire blowout. The rider of the motorcycle sued,
among others, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd., the Taiwanese
manufacturer which had produced the tube within the tire. The defend-
ant made twenty percent of its total United States sales in California.
Cheng Shin filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnity from Asahi, the
manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly. Asahi, a Japanese corpora-
tion, sold 1,350,000 valve assemblies to Cheng Shin in the period from
1978 to 1982. In addition, Asahi sold valve assemblies to numerous
other manufacturers selling their products in California. Asahi itself,
however, had no offices, property or agents in California and neither
solicited business nor made any direct sales in that state.
Reversing the California Supreme Court,61 the United States Supreme
Court held unanimously that the due process clause prevented California
from asserting jurisdiction over Asahi. The Court was deeply divided on
the question of whether the Japanese manufacturer had purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California. Justice
O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell and Scalia (the
O'Connor group) argued that Asahi's position was analogous to that of
the defendant in World-Wide Volkswagen. They contended that because
Asahi itself had not made the choice to send its products to California,
the assertion of jurisdiction was unconstitutional.62 By contrast, Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun (the Brennan group) argued
that once a manufacturer inserts its product into the stream of commerce
with the knowledge that the product will eventually be used in the forum
state, the requirement of purposeful availment is satisfied.6" While Jus-
tice Stevens declined to reach the issue, he indicated that he would have
adopted an intermediate approach, basing the constitutional analysis on
60. Id. at 295.
61. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.3d 35, 210 Cal. Rptr. 385, 702 P.2d 543
(1985) (holding jurisdiction constitutional because once a manufacturer delivers its product into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that it will be purchased by a consumer in the forum state
the manufacturer has invoked the benefits and protections of the forum state's laws).
62. 107 S. Ct. at 1031-33 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
63. Id. at 1035-1038 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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the "volume, value and the hazardous nature of the components"" at
issue. Stevens suggested that "in most circumstances" he would find ju-
risdiction over a manufacturer such as Asahi permissible.65 Thus, five
members of the Court appeared to believe that Asahi's activities consti-
tuted purposeful availment; the result apparently turned on other factors.
The portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion supported by all the Jus-
tices except Justice Scalia therefore is of paramount importance. In that
part of her opinion, Justice O'Connor concluded that whatever one's
view of the purposeful availment issue, the assertion of jurisdiction over
Asahi would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.66 The opinion recited the familiar litany of factors that the Court
considers in personal jurisdiction analysis: the defendant's burden, the
forum state's interest, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, the inter-
state judicial system's interest in obtaining the efficient resolution of con-
troversies, and the common interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental substantive policies.67 In finding the assertion of jurisdic-
tion improper, Justice O'Connor relied heavily on two factors which de-
rived from the international scope of the jurisdictional problem: "[tihe
unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign
legal system" and the potential implications for federal foreign policy.6
The near-unanimous opinion also focused on the distance which the de-
fendant would be forced to travel to defend itself and the fact that the
rider's claim against Cheng Shin had been settled, leaving only the in-
demnity issue to be adjudicated. Finally, O'Connor argued that because
no California resident was a party to the cross-claim, the interest of the
state in the resolution of the claim was "slight," and thus insufficient to
justify the imposition of the "serious burdens" on Asahi.69
3. The Views of the Commentators
Commentators advocate a variety of approaches to the specific juris-
diction problem. Some argue that the existence of state interests should
be crucial.7" Others suggest that the convenience of the defendant should
64. Id. at 1038 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1033-35.
67. Id. at 1034 (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 1034-35.
69. Id. at 1035.
70. See, eg., McDougal, Judicial Jurisdiction: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35
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be determinative.7 1 Still others contend that the Court should consider
the entire laundry list of factors to which the Court has referred in Asahi
and other cases.72 In the abstract, any one of these approaches might
arguably generate the most fair result. Many of the suggestions, how-
ever, are totally inconsistent with the existing pattern of decisions from
the Court.
Methodologies that focus on the actual inconvenience that the defend-
ant would suffer if forced to defend in the forum are clearly inconsistent
with the Court's personal jurisdiction analysis. Two related concepts
which have been central to the structure of the Court's analysis preclude
the application of such theories. The first is the dichotomy between the
constraints placed on the respective reaches of state and federal jurisdic-
tion. Under currently accepted case law, Congress may establish nation-
wide personal jurisdiction for the federal courts.73 Thus, in a diversity
case the Constitution may prohibit a state from forcing a defendant to
appear and defend the merits, while the federal court located across the
street would be under no such restrictions. Such a situation is hardly
consistent with a system of jurisdictional analysis based on
convenience. 74
Some commentators have challenged the proposition that there are no
constitutional limitations on the ability of the federal courts to assert na-
tionwide personal jurisdiction.75  While lower court opinions occasion-
ally support this skepticism, 76 the Supreme Court seems to entertain no
such doubts. The Court clearly stated this proposition contemporane-
VAND. L. REv. 1, 12-15 (1982); Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdic-
tion, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 913, 926 (1985).
71. See, eg., Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal
Courts, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 41-43 (1984); Redish, supra note 13, at 1137-39.
72. See, eg., Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal
Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 451-55 (1981); Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction
After Shatfer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,
20 ARIz. L. REv. 861, 890-98 (1978).
73. See, e-g., Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Robertson v. Rail-
road Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925).
74. One should note, however, that every circuit has held that in typical diversity cases under
the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the personal jurisdiction of a federal district court
reaches no further than that of the courts of the state in which it sits. See, e.g., Bowman v. Curt G.
Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2nd Cir.
1963); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 116 n.15 (2d ed. 1980). Thus,
the minimum contacts test continues to have a strong impact on litigation in the federal courts.
75. See, eg., Clermont, supra note 51, at 435-37; Fullerton, supra note 50.
76. See Clermont, supra note 51, at 435 n.116.
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ously with International Shoe.77 Moreover, four of the Justices who par-
ticipated in Shaffer explicitly reaffirmed the doctrine,78 while no sitting
Justice has even implicitly cast doubt on its continued vitality.7 9 Thus, in
the absence of some clear signal to the contrary from the Court, one may
assume that the due process clause of the fifth amendment would not
prevent Congress from establishing nationwide federal jurisdiction in all
cases cognizable under Article III.
Moreover, even if convenience theorists were able to ignore the appar-
ent dissonance between the respective jurisdictional reaches of state and
federal courts, they would still be faced with another concept which is
inconsistent with a convenience theory. The distance that a defendant
must travel appears to be irrelevant in the Court's personal jurisdiction
decisions dealing with state courts. Instead, the key issue has been
whether the defendant will be forced to cross a state line to defend.80
Thus, the same contacts which will suffice to subject a New Jersey de-
fendant to the jurisdiction of a Pennsylvania court will also allow a Cali-
fornia court to assert jurisdiction over the same defendant. At the same
time, the fourteenth amendment is irrelevant to an Alaska court's deci-
sion to force a resident of Juneau to defend a lawsuit in Nome in the dead
of winter. This type of pattern is totally inconsistent with a convenience-
based theory of constraints on personal jurisdiction.
The status of interest-based analyses is more equivocal. Clearly, the
mere fact that a state has an interest in a controversy cannot justify the
assertion of personal jurisdiction under existing precedent. Simply limit-
ing judicial jurisdiction to cases in which the forum state has an interest
would provide little protection for nonresident defendants. One of the
77. Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. at 442 ("Congress [can] provide for service of
process anywhere in the United States.").
78. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553-54 (1980) (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 191-92 (1979) (White, J., joined by Bren-
nan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
79. The most recent suggestion that the fifth amendment restricts the authority of the federal
courts exercise national jurisdiction came from former Justice Lewis Powell. Insurance Corp. of
Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 714-16 (1982) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
80. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 301 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("[I]t would not be sensible to make the constitutional rule turn solely on the number of miles
the defendant must travel to the courtroom.") (footnote omitted). But cf Kulko v. Superior Ct. of
California, 436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978) (noting that actions of defendant were not such that "a reasonable
parent would expect to result in the substantial financial burden and personal strain of litigating a
child-support suit in a forum 3,000 miles away").
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most basic duties of any sovereign is to provide protection for the legal
rights of its citizenry. The courts of a state therefore have an interest in
any case in which one of its citizens is a plaintiff. Thus, if the existence of
a state interest were the touchstone for power to assert personal jurisdic-
tion, defendants would almost always be subject to jurisdiction in the
forum chosen by the plaintiffs. Obviously, the Supreme Court does not
take this position.
Nonetheless, the Court does seem concerned about state interests in
some cases. In Asahi, for example, the Court explicitly noted the lack of
state interest as a reason for holding that California did not have jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.81 Similarly, in both Burger King and Keeton the
Court embarked on extended discussions of the interests of the forum in
holding that the state court could exercise personal jurisdiction. 2 Given
these opinions, one cannot say that forum state interests are irrelevant to
the Court's analysis.
Despite cases such as Asahi, Burger King and Keeton, the basic con-
cept of purposeful availment-not the search for state interests-is
clearly the dominant factor in contemporary specific personal jurisdic-
tion analysis. First, the Court has never found constitutional the exercise
of personal jurisdiction in the absence of purposeful availment by the
defendant.8 3 Second, the cases that focus on state interests are somewhat
equivocal. The Asahi decision may well reflect the special problems in-
volved in asserting jurisdiction over foreign defendants. Moreover, in
that case four justices found no purposeful availment84 and four others
81. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034 (1987).
82. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482-83; Keeton, 465 U.S. at 775-78.
83. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), is the one exception to the purposeful
availment principle. Phillips concerned the application of a Kansas class action statute to out-of-
state members of a plaintiff class. Under the statute, once a court had certified a class of plaintiffs, all
members of that class were notified of the pendency of the action. Unless an absent class member
affirmatively "opted out" of the lawsuit, the ensuing lawsuit would adjudicate his rights. This provi-
sion was challenged on the ground that it violated the due process rights of members of the plaintiff
class who were otherwise unconnected with the state. The Court held that the Kansas statute did
not violate the due process clause.
Obviously, even with the "opt-out" provision, the absent plaintiffs in Phillips did not voluntarily
associate themselves with the forum state. Moreover, as the Court noted, they ran the risk of being
deprived of a species of "property"-a chose in action. See id. at 807-08. Nonetheless, Phillips does
not undermine the general principle that voluntary association with the forum is necessary for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. The Court specifically noted that the case was sui generis, governed
by principles different from those that apply in cases where a defendant is resisting the authority of
the court. See id. at 808-12.
84. 107 S. Ct. at 1031-35 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
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described their conclusion as a "rare" instance in which purposeful avail-
ment existed, but the forum nonetheless lacked jurisdiction. 5 In Burger
King, the Court discussed state interests only after it concluded that the
defendant's purposeful availment created a presumption that personal ju-
risdiction was constitutional.8 6 Similarly, in Keeton, Justice Rehnquist
discussed state interests only after noting that the defendant's contacts
"ordinarily" would give rise to personal jurisdiction over it. He then
strained to find a forum state interest notwithstanding the lack of a resi-
dent plaintiff.8 7 In short, it seems fair to conclude that at most, state
interests are relevant only in marginal cases.
From a purposeful availment perspective, Burger King, Keeton, World-
Wide Volkswagen and Asahi together establish the basic principles that
govern the Court's specific jurisdiction jurisprudence. First, specific ju-
risdiction must concern a transaction that is connected with the forum
state. Second, in the absence of unusual circumstances, specific jurisdic-
tion will attach to a defendant if, in connection with that transaction, he
creates a contact with the forum state. Third, specific jurisdiction will
not apply to a defendant if the contacts are created only by the unilateral
activity of the plaintiff. Fourth, the Justices are split on the significance
of the defendant's insertion of goods into the "stream of commerce" with
knowledge that they may reach the forum state. Finally, in some margi-
nal cases, the lack of a state interest may render otherwise constitutional
assertions of jurisdiction unacceptable.
B. General Jurisdiction
Unlike specific jurisdiction, in modern times the Supreme Court has
decided few general jurisdiction cases. The paradigm for general juris-
diction analysis is the pre-International Shoe decision in Milliken v.
Meyer.88 Milliken was a lawsuit brought in Colorado to enforce a Wyo-
ming judgment. In the Wyoming action the defendant, a Wyoming dom-
iciliary, had been personally served with process in Colorado, but had
declined to appear and defend. The Supreme Court held that the Wyo-
ming judgment must be enforced because the Wyoming court had consti-
tutionally exercised jurisdiction over the absent defendant. The Supreme
Court stated:
85. Id. at 1035 (Brennan, J.).
86. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1985).
87. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Co., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
88. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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[T]he authority of a state over one of its citizens is not terminated by the
mere fact of his absence from the state. The state which accords him privi-
leges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his domi-
cile may also exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the privileges of
residence within the state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection
of its laws, are inseparable" from the various incidences of state citizen-
ship.... The responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship
to the state which domicile creates. That relationship is not dissolved by
mere absence from the state. The attendant duties, like the rights and privi-
leges incident to domicile, are not dependent on continuous presence in the
state.
8 9
After the International Shoe opinion, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co. 90 extended the reach of general jurisdiction. The defendant
in Perkins was a corporation chartered by the government of the Philip-
pine Islands. During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during
World War II, the corporation carried on a continuous and systematic,
but limited, part of its general business in the state of Ohio. The Ohio
activities of the corporation included directors' meetings, business corre-
spondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries and purchases
of machinery for mining operations. Under these circumstances, the
Supreme Court held that the due process clause did not prevent the Ohio
courts from asserting postwar jurisdiction over the corporation in an ac-
tion which did not relate to or arise out of the Ohio activities of the
corporation.
Neither Milliken nor Perkins used the term "general jurisdiction" to
describe the basis on which state court authority to adjudicate was pre-
mised. Both cases, however, stand for the fundamental principle that in
some circumstances a state court may constitutionally assert jurisdiction
over a cause of action that is unrelated to the state. This principle is the
essence of the concept of general jurisdiction.
In the only two recent cases in which the Supreme Court has faced the
issue, the Justices have declined to expand the reach of general jurisdic-
tion. The first of these cases was Shaffer 9 itself. The Court in Shaffer
plainly saw quasi in rem cases as presenting problems of general jurisdic-
tion, arguing that "[in] the present case.. .the property which now serves
as the basis for state-court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the
89. Id. at 463-64 (citations omitted).
90. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
91. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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plaintiff's cause of action."92 Viewing the case from this perspective, the
Court found the assertion of jurisdiction unconstitutional.93
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol) 94 was the
first case in which the Court explicitly relied upon the distinction be-
tween general and specific jurisdiction. Helicol, an action brought in
Texas state court, arose from a Peruvian helicopter accident. The de-
fendant was a Colombian corporation which had contracted to provide
helicopter transportation for a Peruvian consortium. The consortium in
turn was the alter ego of a joint venture headquartered in Houston. The
defendant had sent its chief executive officer to Houston to negotiate the
transportation contract; accepted checks drawn on a Texas bank;
purchased helicopters, equipment and training sessions from a Texas
manufacturer; and sent personnel to that manufacturer's facilities for
training. These actions constituted the defendant's only contacts with
the forum state.
The plaintiff's strongest claim would have been based on the concept
of specific jurisdiction. The majority opinion noted, however, that the
plaintiffs had conceded that the defendant's contacts with Texas were
unrelated to the cause of action and thus a specific jurisdiction theory
was not viable.95 The Court then concluded that under the rubric of
general jurisdiction, the defendant lacked the continuous and systematic
contacts necessary to subject it to the Texas court's general jurisdiction.96
L The Commentators' View of General Jurisdiction
Perhaps because of the paucity of the case law, until quite recently
post-Warren Court scholars devoted little effort to developing a theory of
general jurisdiction.97 Instead, they focused their attention on problems
of specific rather than general jurisdiction. In the past year, however,
92. Id. at 208-09. The Court also concluded that the forum could not constitutionally rely on
the theory of specific jurisdiction to assert power over the defendant. Id. at 211-12.
93. Elsewhere, I have argued that Shaffer should have been conceptualized as a dispute over
the property that the state of Delaware had seized. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark: Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed from a Distance, 1986 B.Y.U.L. REV.
1043, 1046-51.
94. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
95. Id. at415&n. 10.
96. Id. at 416.
97. Exceptions include Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM
L. REV. 960, 979-86 (1981) and Richman, Review Essay Part -Casad's Jurisdiction in Civil Actions
Part Il-A Sliding Scale to Supplement the Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72
CALM. L. REV. 1328 (1984). See also Lewis, A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible
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this situation has changed; two major efforts to construct a detailed the-
ory of general jurisdiction have appeared in the literature.
In one such theory, Professor Mary Twitchell views general jurisdic-
tion as a device to fill gaps left in a system that should be based primarily
on specific jurisdiction analysis.9" Functional considerations dominate
her approach. While noting that judicial and legislative inertia have no
doubt played a large role in the continued use of general jurisdiction, she
also identifies two policy reasons for the survival of the concept: the pos-
sibility that it may fill a "legitimate societal need" not addressed by spe-
cific jurisdiction, and the fact that for most defendants, being subject to
general jurisdiction in many contexts is foreseeable.99 Twitchell argues
that in a properly ordered judicial system, general jurisdiction should
serve a single purpose-that of "provid[ing] plaintiffs with a forum
whose power over a defendant is so undisputed that the parties and the
judiciary will not need to expend significant resources in the preliminary
jurisdictional inquiry."" Viewing the problem from this perspective,
she would limit the application of general jurisdiction to a defendant's
"home base" and (perhaps) a limited number of cases in which defendant
corporations have particularly extensive connections with the forum.101
Twitchell dismisses transient jurisdiction because in her view it "carries
few benefits and many risks, particularly the risk of forum shopping."'10 2
A group of scholars led by Professor R. Lea Brilmayer takes a more
expansive view of the proper scope of general jurisdiction. 103 Brilmayer
argues that a state has general jurisdiction over any entity that rises to
the level of an "insider, such that the defendant may be safely relegated
to the political processes and such that the defendant receives that
amount and types of benefits that justify the reciprocal responsibility of
being subject to jurisdiction."'" She would define insider status by com-
paring the defendant to what she views as the paradigm bases for general
jurisdiction-domicile, place of incorporation, and principle place of
Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1984) (arguing that general and specific
jurisdiction should be merged into single unified approach).
98. Twitchell, supra note 13.
99. Id. at 630-33.
100. Id. at 676.
101. Id. at 667-79.
102. Id. at 670.
103. Brilmayer, Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, O'Brien & Neuwirth, A General Look at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. REv. 721 (1988).
104. Id. at 742.
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business. 10 Under the Brilmayer model, states could exercise general
jurisdiction over defendants whose in-state activities were similar to
those of the paradigm cases.10 6
Brilmayer analyzes the transient jurisdiction problem in much greater
detail than Twitchell. She first rejects the claim that transient jurisdic-
tion is justifiable simply because defendants are on notice that they may
be served while in the forum state. She then contends that a state has no
interest in regulating the activities of a person who is simply passing
through the state, and rejects the notion that the defendant may "con-
sent" to jurisdiction simply by being present voluntarily within the forum
state. 107 While conceding that the doctrine of transient jurisdiction pro-
vides a straightforward, easily applied rule, Brilmayer concludes that
"[o]n balance, transient jurisdiction has outlived its theoretical
justification."10 8
Either the Twitchell or Brilmayer model might seem attractive in the
abstract. Once again, however, one relevant question remains whether
either approach fits well with the established case law. Taken alone, the
Supreme Court's sparse pronouncements on general jurisdiction are in-
sufficiently detailed to make such a judgment. When analyzed with the
specific jurisdiction cases, however, a rather clear picture of an overarch-
ing vision of personal jurisdiction analysis emerges-a vision that is in-
consistent with the theories of both Twitchell and Brilmayer.
The Court's approach is based on a subtle interaction between con-
cepts of sovereignty and fairness. In analyzing this interaction, Professor
Allen Stein argues that International Shoe and its progeny should be
viewed as being fundamentally concerned with the allocation of sover-
eign authority among the various states.l °9 One can reasonably treat
subject matter jurisdiction issues in this fashion; in theory at least, the
parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent.110 Personal
105. Id. at 728-35.
106. Id. at 742.
107. Id. at 748-55.
108. Id. at 755.
109. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65
TEx. L. REv. 689, 738-48 (1987).
110. Some might argue that the distinction between subject matter and personal jurisdiction is
largely illusory. This argument rests on two observations. First, an otherwise final judgment in
which the rendering court has personal jurisdiction over the parties cannot be attacked collaterally
on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S.
106 (1963); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951). Second, in the absence of a jurisdictional
complaint by the defendant, courts are unlikely to take judicial notice of a lack of subject matter
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jurisdiction questions raise different issues, however. If subject matter
jurisdiction objections are surmounted, the parties can generally allocate
sovereign authority by agreement to the courts of any state which both
parties find congenial. Problems arise when the parties disagree on
which forum is the most desirable. The legal system must provide princi-
ples by which the courts can solve such disputes. Thus, personal juris-
diction analysis should represent concern for the allocation of authority
between the parties, not for the allocation of authority among the states.
The American system governing this allocation is based on a fairly
complex set of principles. First, the system envisions a set of fora in
which it would not be unfair for the defendant to be forced to defend.
The plaintiff has the power to choose any forum within that set as the
venue for the lawsuit. If the plaintiff chooses a court that is not within
the set of fair fora, the defendant has the right to veto the plaintiff's
choice (although generally not to designate specifically the court that will
hear the lawsuit). 111 The key question is thus not whether the plaintiff
has chosen the forum most appropriate to hear the lawsuit, but only
whether the court selected by the plaintiff is included in the set of fair
fora.
Despite its appropriate focus on fairness, the touchstone of the Court's
theory is a traditional conception of the scope of states' sovereign author-
ity. As Judge Goldberg recognized in Mordelt, an assumption of judicial
jurisdiction is essentially an act of sovereign authority."1 2 Traditionally,
jurisdiction. Thus, a defendant can effectively confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court simply by
failing to raise a jurisdictional objection.
This argument suffers from both practical and theoretical flaws. First, one can identify situations
in which courts have held themselves to lack subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the failure
of the parties to raise the issue. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot,
347 U.S. 610 0954). More importantly, when the aggrieved party has made a general appearance in
the original action, the reasons for refusing to allow collateral attack on issues of personal jurisdic-
tion are quite different from those that protect judgments on subject matter jurisdiction. In the
personal jurisdiction situation the refusal to allow collateral attack is premised on the proposition
that when the defendant has appeared the decision to take jurisdiction is perforce correct; by appear-
ing she has waived any objection which she might have. By contrast, the judge may have made a
mistake on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The system is willing to tolerate such mistakes,
however, in order to serve other values such as the desirability of repose. See Durfee v. Duke, 375
U.S. 106 (1963). Thus the two different types ofjurisdiction remain analytically quite separable. But
see Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
781, 787-92 (1985) (suggesting that differences between subject matter and personal jurisdiction are
typically overstated).
111. The exception is a situation in which only one forum falls into the set of those that is "fair"
to the defendant.
112. Amusement Equipment, Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1985).
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such authority does not depend on either democratic theory1 1 3 or the
existence of a governmental interest in the matter being regulated.' 14 In-
stead, the basis and scope of that authority can be derived from two
cases: Skiriotes v. Florida115 and New York v. O'Neill.116
In Skiriotes a state court convicted a Florida resident for violating a
Florida statute that prohibited the use of diving equipment in harvesting
ocean sponges. The defendant argued that he was outside the territorial
waters of Florida when he took the sponges, and therefore the law could
not constitutionally apply to him. The Supreme Court disagreed, recog-
nizing that the state could enforce its criminal laws against its own citi-
zens, even when those citizens were operating on the high seas. 117
In O'Neill a visitor to Florida was subpoenaed by New York as a wit-
ness for a criminal proceeding in New York. Pursuant to an interstate
agreement, Florida transported O'Neill to New York. O'Neill objected,
arguing that Florida lacked power to order a nonresident to perform acts
outside the state. The Supreme Court disagreed and asserted that "the
Florida courts had immediate personal jurisdiction over [O'Neill] by vir-
tue of his presence within that State."11
Taken together, Skiriotes and O'Neill establish two principles. First, a
state has power to proscribe rules of conduct for its own citizens, wher-
ever they may be located. Second, the state has authority to regulate all
activities within its territorial boundaries. These two concepts describe
the limits of state court personal jurisdiction over nonconsenting parties.
Without more, this model would be a reincarnation of the Pennoyer
power theory. What brings the model under the more modem rubric of
fairness is a second element-the concept of voluntariness. Essentially,
both specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction require that both par-
ties voluntarily take some action that brings them within the sovereign
authority of the forum state. Generally, the plaintiff takes that action
simply by initiating the lawsuit.1I 9 The problem is thus to analyze the
activities of the defendant to see if he has taken the necessary action.
113. But see Brilmayer, supra note 103, at 749.
114. But see Brilmayer, supra note 103, at 752; Stein, supra note 109, at 738.
115. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
116. 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
117. 313 U.S. at 76.
118. 359 U.S. at 8-9.
119. But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), discussed supra note 83
(Members of plaintiff class need not voluntarily take some action to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
Rather, the class members must "opt-out" to avoid jurisdiction.).
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The purposeful availment cases illustrate this point. Each of the cases
involved a dispute with elements that took place within the territorial
boundaries (and thus the sovereign authority) of the forum. The ques-
tion was whether the defendant in each case had voluntarily associated
itself with those elements. One can view the difference between the
O'Connor and Brennan groups in Asahi as a dispute over the nature of
voluntariness. 12
0
The pattern of the Supreme Court's decisions on general jurisdiction
fits comfortably into the other prong of the sovereignty-based theory-
the notion that a state has authority over all activities of its citizenry,
wherever those activities take place. Milliken 121 presents the clearest
case. The Milliken opinion explicitly relies on the reciprocal obligations
created by the defendant's citizenship in the forum state to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction. Perkins122 is only slightly more problematic.
While the corporation was created under Philippine law, at the time of
service it maintained its main office in Ohio.'23 Moreover, by conducting
such a large portion of its business in the forum state, the corporation
accepted the protection of the state in quite general terms. Thus, the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Ohio courts does not seem in any way
unfair or unreasonable.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), presented an analogous problem. In Kulko, a New
York couple with two children separated. The father remained in New York and the mother moved
to California and obtained a Haitian divorce. Under the initial separation agreement, the children
were to live with the father during the school year and the mother during vacation times. The
agreement also provided that the father would pay the mother $3,000 per year as support for the
children during the periods when they were with their mother. One year later, when leaving for
Christmas vacation, one of the children told the father that she wished to live permanently with her
mother. The father then bought the child a one-way ticket to California and sent her and her be-
longings to that state. Two years later, without the knowledge of the father, the other child obtained
an airplane ticket and moved permanently to California to be with his mother. The mother then
brought an action in California state court to have the child support payments increased. If the
Supreme Court had found that the decision to change the children's residence could be attributed to
the father, it would no doubt have found that the California courts had jurisdiction over the support
action. Instead, however, the Court held that the California courts could not constitutionally exer-
cise jurisdiction. The Court characterized the situation as one in which the father had simply fi-
nanced the choice of others to move to California. See id. at 92-98. See also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 213-15 (1977) (purchase of stock in Delaware corporation and acceptance of position of
board of directors of corporation does not constitute purposeful availment of privilege of conducting
business in Delaware).
121. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
122. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
123. See Weintraub, supra note 74, at 146.
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By contrast, neither the defendants in Shaffer124 nor Helicol 125 had
entered into the kind of relationship with the forum that would support a
finding that they had accepted the protections of the forum in any but the
most specifically defined terms. Certainly, one would not argue that the
mere ownership of stock seized by the Delaware court in Shaffer created
any sort of special relationship between the shareholder and the state of
Delaware that would justify holding that the shareholder was generally
under the protection of that state. Similarly, the contacts between the
defendant and the forum state in Helicol are best defined as episodic and
narrowly focused.'" 6 Thus, while in both cases a strong argument could
be made for the exercise of specific, transaction-related jurisdiction, the
Court was clearly correct in finding that the prerequisites for general ju-
risdiction were not present.
By contrast, transient jurisdiction fits comfortably with the sover-
eignty-related analysis that has been adopted by the Court. Admittedly,
by definition the transient defendant does not have all of the rights and
responsibilities of citizenship in the state in which he is present at the
time of service of process. He neither owes unqualified allegiance to that
state nor is entitled to participate in the selection of government officials.
Thus, the transient is not in precisely the same position as the defendant
in Milliken.
At the same time, the jurisdictional claims of the forum state over the
transient are far less sweeping than those that the forum claims over its
own citizens. Milliken points out that the state to which a defendant
owes primary allegiance may assert its sovereignty over that defendant
even if he is absent from his domicile. By contrast, transient jurisdiction
is based solely on the premise that the defendant is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the forum state only if he is served within the physical boundaries
of that state. All concede that if the transient leaves the state of which he
is not a domiciliary without being served, he is not subject to the general
jurisdiction of the courts of that state.
One of the key issues is temporal. If one views the question as whether
the forum has jurisdiction at the time of the trial (or the jurisdictional
hearing), then the case for transient jurisdiction appears weak. The tran-
sient generally will be outside the forum state at that point. Therefore,
the forum state appears to be attempting to exercise its sovereign power
124. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
125. Helicol Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
126. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
19881
Washington University Open Scholarship
698 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
over a nondomiciliary who is outside the boundaries which demarcate
the authority of the state government.
This characterization is somewhat misleading, however. One must
consider the issue of jurisdiction at the time the lawsuit begins. No one,
for example, would claim that a court loses general jurisdiction over a
party who changes his citizenship after a trial has begun. Conceptually,
the lawsuit begins when process is served; the time at which judicial pro-
ceedings actually commence is largely a matter of happenstance. Thus it
is the relationship between the defendant and the forum at the time of
service-a time when the nondomiciliary is present in the forum state-
that must be considered in assessing transient jurisdiction.
At the time of service the transient has placed himself fully within the
sovereign authority of the state. Moreover, he has important claims
against the government of the state in which he is present. For example,
the privileges and immunities clause of article IV of the federal Constitu-
tion requires that the state government grant him a variety of rights. For
purposes of considering transient jurisdiction, two of these rights are par-
ticularly important: the right to protection of the law and the right of
access to state courts.
The right to protection of the law guarantees that a transient can call
on state power to protect his person and property. Suppose, for example,
that a resident (R) of the forum state (F) claims that a transient (T) owes
him money under a contract totally unrelated to the forum state (F).
While T is visiting his sister in F, R attempts to seize the money in 7's
wallet to satisfy his claim. If T invoked the sovereign authority of the F
government by calling upon the F police, they would no doubt protect
him from R's action, labeling it an attempt at unlawful appropriation of
T's assets.
Of course, the proper course of action for R would be to obtain a judi-
cial determination that T in fact owed him the money. If a court vested
with the necessary jurisdiction made such a determination, the finding,
coupled with an appropriate enforcement order, would in effect instruct
the F police not merely not to interfere with R's collection efforts, but to
exercise their sovereign authority to aid him in those efforts. If the F
courts lack jurisdiction to issue such an order, a massive asymmetry
would be created. T would be entitled to the full protection of Fs sover-
eign power; at the same time, however, he would be entirely free from the
authority of the arm of the F government designated to determine his
rights and responsibilities.
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Indeed, in the absence of transient jurisdiction, no sovereign (other
than the federal government) possesses the authority to compel T to ac-
cede to R's presumably lawful demands. While the courts of other states
may issue judgments in favor of R, they have no power to enforce those
orders directly against an absent defendant. Of course, the full faith and
credit clause may compel the F courts themselves to enforce those orders.
But this factor simply controls the decision of the F court on the merits;
it does not alter the fact that only the F government has power to coerce
T while T is within the territorial boundaries defining the limits of F's
power.
The asymmetry becomes even more apparent when one considers T's
right of access to the courts of the forum state. Subject only to the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens, an out-of-state plaintiff may use state
courts in all circumstances in which those courts would be available to
state citizens. This right is particularly important in cases where the de-
fendant is a citizen of the forum state. Under Milliken, the plaintiff can
utilize the state courts to bring any action against such a defendant.
Thus, if courts reject the doctrine of transient jurisdiction, T would have
the full benefit of the power of F's courts while retaining his own immu-
nity from their authority."2 7
In short, transient jurisdiction is entirely consistent with the basic
premises of sovereign authority and voluntariness that underlie contem-
porary personal jurisdiction analysis. One might still attack the concept
if it were inconsistent with some compelling functional imperative of the
system. Twitchell's claim that transient jurisdiction would encourage
"forum-shopping" is such an argument.' Close analysis, however,
reveals that her concerns are unfounded.
Given the basic structure of the American judicial system, the mere
fact that transient jurisdiction gives the plaintiff a choice of forums does
not condemn the theory. As already noted,12 9 the system presupposes
that the plaintiff may choose any forum that is not fundamentally unfair
to the defendant. Because transient jurisdiction fulfills the Court's basic
premises of fairness, the choice of forum cannot be unfair unless it vio-
lates some other imperative.
127. The standard rationalization for this disparity is that Tvoluntarily subjected himself to F's
authority and jurisdiction. However, this statement does not explain why T has the privilege of so
subjecting himself, i.e., why T may use the state courts.
128. Twitchell, supra note 13, at 670.
129. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
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The most likely problem is that the transient forum might adopt a
choice of law rule that would be unfair to the defendant.1 30 I have ar-
gued elsewhere that the defendant will rarely have a constitutionally cog-
nizable interest in having a particular rule chosen to govern his case,13 1
but even if he did have such an interest, the problem would be better
addressed directly through constitutional limitations on choice-of-law. 132
Such an approach protects the defendant's right to a "fair" choice of law
and at the same time vindicates the plaintiff's interest in proceeding in
any forum with which the defendant has voluntarily associated himself.
Thus, concerns related to choice-of-law problems do not provide a suffi-
cient reason to restrict the plaintiff's choice of forum.
Other considerations do suggest the need for limits on the exercise of
transient jurisdiction, however. First, courts should retain the exception
for situations in which the defendant has been fraudulently induced to
enter the forum state. One of the critical factors in the Supreme Court's
approach to personal jurisdiction has been the notion that the defendant
must voluntarily associate himself with the forum. Where the plaintiff
has lured the defendant into the forum state under false pretenses, his
association cannot be deemed "voluntary" in any meaningful sense.
Thus, absent some other connection, he should not be subject to jurisdic-
tion in the courts of that state.
Cases such as Burger King, Keeton, and Asahi also suggest another
plausible argument for limiting transient jurisdiction. Taken together,
these cases might be taken to indicate that state courts cannot assert ju-
risdiction in cases in which they have no interest whatsoever. The appli-
cability of this principle to transient jurisdiction cases is uncertain. The
Burger King line of cases each involved transaction-related claims of spe-
cific jurisdiction, while transient jurisdiction is based on status-related
general jurisdiction. Nonetheless, these cases may indicate that states
may not constitutionally require defendants to appear in cases such as
Schreiber 13 3 where the plaintiff was not a resident of the forum state and
the transaction was totally unrelated to that state.
130. See, eg., Ehrenzweig, supra note 8, at 290-91.
131. Maltz, Visions of Fairness: The Relationship Between Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law, 30
ARiz. L. REv. 751 (1988).
132. See, eg., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984). (The question of the
applicability of the forum state's statute of limitations is a choice-of-law concern that should not
complicate or distort the jurisdictional inquiry.)
133. Schreiber, 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (10th
Cir. 1979).
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However, even giving the Burger King cases their broadest reading,
much of transient jurisdiction would remain intact. As already noted,
whenever the plaintiff is a forum resident, the state will have a clear in-
terest in adjudicating his claim. 134 The presence of such an interest
plainly avoids the limitations of the Burger King analysis. Thus, in many
instances transient jurisdiction would remain comfortably within the
framework of analysis that the Supreme Court has established in per-
sonal jurisdiction cases.
III. CONCLUSION
Neither side can claim a decisive victory in the dispute over transient
jurisdiction. The dispute centers on the most basic concepts of sovereign
authority and fairness in the relationship between the individual and gov-
ernment. These concepts are not the product of reasoning from basic
premises. They are themselves the type of premises from which rational
argument proceeds. By definition, such premises are not subject to proof
or disproof.
Nonetheless, one can identify a number of important factors that sup-
port the exercise of jurisdiction over transients. The theory of transient
jurisdiction plainly reflects a concept of fairness that has deep historical
roots in the American system. Moreover, the same concept is reflected in
the development of the Supreme Court's contemporary personal jurisdic-
tion jurisprudence. Thus, transient jurisdiction deserves far more respect
than legal scholars generally accord to it.
134. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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